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DEFAMATIONVIAHYPERLINKS—MORETHANMEETSTHE
EYE
Hyperlinks make the World Wide Web go round. They find and connect
information and content from a wealth of sources on the web including, from time
to time, defamatory material. Newton, the owner and operator of a website in
British Columbia, posted an article entitled “Free Speech in Canada”. The article
itself was not alleged to be defamatory of Crookes, a politician. However, it
incorporated hyperlinks to other internet websites that contained defamatory
material. Notwithstanding requests from Crookes and his lawyer, Newton refused
to remove the hyperlinks. Did Newton’s act of hyperlinking to internet websites
constitute “publication” of the defamatorymaterial? The Supreme Court of Canada
in Crookes v Newton [2011] 3 S.C.R. 269 responded with an emphatic “no”.
Though a correct outcome on the facts, there were three distinct judicial approaches
emanating from the court that bear scrutiny.
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The first approach was encapsulated in the judgment of the majority delivered
by Abella J. which adopted the “bright-line rule” that a hyperlink by itself should
never be treated as amounting to publication of the linked content. Essentially,
what you see is what you get, nothing more (than a mere hyperlink). The learned
judge stated that it is “only when a hyperlinker presents content from the
hyperlinked material in a way that actually repeats the defamatory content, should
that content be considered to be ‘published’ by the hyperlinker” (at [42]). This
categorical “no publication” rule applies even if the reader follows the hyperlinks
and accesses the content. The majority decision is consistent with prior analogous
cases, albeit not specifically dealing with defamatory publications via hyperlinks.
Several years ago, the British Columbia Court of Appeal inCarter v BC Federation
of Foster Parents Association (2005) 42 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1 held that the defendants,
who had distributed a printed newsletter making reference to a forum on a website
that contained a defamatory comment, were not liable as there was no element of
“control” by the defendants over the forum and they did not take any active steps
to draw attention to the forum (at [13]; see also MacFadden v Anthony 117
N.Y.S.2d 520 (1952); Klein v Biben 296 N.Y. 638 (1946)).
The traditional rule is that “publication” arises from an act of the defendant
which conveyed the defamatory meaning to a third party (McNichol v Grandy
[1931] S.C.R. 696 at [9]). Here, the majority judges were concerned that the
application of the traditional rule would render hyperlinkers presumptively liable
for the defamatory material. Contrary to such presumption, Abella J. noted that a
hyperlink in itself does not involve “control” over the hyperlinked content, but is
merely a reference to “other content” (at [26]–[27] and [29]). That is, hyperlinks
communicate the existence of information but not the content itself (at [30]).
Further, the content can be changed at any time by the secondary author beyond
the control of the primary author who inserted the hyperlink in the first place (at
[27]). Though the primary author may have facilitated the transfer of information,
he does not participate in the “creation or development” of the content (at [28]).
Given the importance of hyperlinks for accessing information on the internet, the
imposition of liability on hyperlinkers pursuant to the traditional rule of publication
would, in the majority opinion, seriously restrict the flow of information and
freedom of expression on the internet (at [30]).
Whilst it is true that a strict imposition of liability on hyperlinkers would
seriously restrict freedom of expression on the internet, the reverse rule, that
hyperlinks would never amount to publication of the hyperlinked information,
favours freedom of expression at the expense of reputational interests. Authors of
online defamatory materials may be anonymous; in such cases, a person defamed
by a hyperlink that connects to defamatory material on a website accessible to
many would be hard put to vindicate his reputation. Further, the inflexible majority
rule ignores the potentially variegated contexts (e.g. specific textual language) and
technological means (e.g. deep or shallow links) through which the hyperlinked
content may be conveyed to a third party. The sole criterion of “control” over any
subsequent changes in the content, as advocated by the majority, cannot fully
accommodate these myriad circumstances. Non-participation in the “creation or
development” of the content should not automatically negate liability. Depending
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on the circumstances, a person who merely repeats the defamatory allegations but
does not participate in creating or developing the content may nonetheless be liable.
The rigid “no publication” rule in light of the “control” criterion may also have
implications for other aspects of the tort of defamation. If the majority reasoning
is extended to other areas of defamation, a defamatory text in which the claimant
is only identified in the hyperlinked information would not be one capable of
referring to the claimant (but this is contrary to the position in Islam Expo Ltd v
The Spectator (1828) Ltd [2010] EWHC 2011 (QB) per Tugendhat J.; see [2011]
SCC 47 at [104] per Deschamps J.). In other instances, extending the strict majority
rule against publication via hyperlinks might actually have the effect of diluting
the defendant’s free expression on the internet, contrary to that advocated by the
majority judges. If the majority judgment were extended, courts would only be
entitled to assess defamatory meaning solely from the text without any reference
to the hyperlinked content. This will prevent the defendant from referring, for
example, to an “antidote” in the linked content that might have the salubrious
effect of neutralising the allegedly defamatory text (Charleston v News Group
Newspapers Ltd [1995] 2 A.C. 65). Another example is where a comment is
contained in the text but the factual basis underlying the comment is found within
the hyperlinked content. If the strict majority rule is applied to preempt any
reference to the factual basis, the defence of fair comment would fail. If so, a rule
that was meant to protect defendants in the name of free expression on the internet
would, ironically, be utilised to deny a defence that protects the expression of fair
comment and/or honest opinions on amatter of public interest via the samemedium
(WIC Radio Ltd v Simpson [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420; Spiller v Joseph [2011] 1 A.C.
852).
In contrast to the majority judgment, the second and third judicial approaches
suggest there is more (to hyperlinks) than meets the eye. Whilst McLachlin C.J.
and Fish J. substantially agreed with the majority judges, they added an important
qualification: a hyperlink contained in the text would amount to publication if the
text, read contextually, indicates “adoption or endorsement of the content of the
hyperlinked text” (at [48] and [50];Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto [1995]
2 S.C.R. 1130 at [176]). The defamatory content, if adopted or endorsed, would
be treated as incorporated into the text via the hyperlink. What does “adoption or
endorsement” mean? First, it must be distinguished from the actual repetition of
defamatory allegations. Secondly, the test of “adoption or endorsement” would
appear to require something beyondmere control over, or knowledge of, the content
in that the text must communicate agreement with the linked content (at [48];
strictly speaking, the word “adoption” does not necessarily import an agreement
with the content but seems to indicate that a conscious choice was made to take
the content on board). The above test is sufficiently stringent for purposes of
publication via hyperlinks when compared to publication by “repetition”. After
all, it is not necessary to show that a person who publishes by actually repeating
defamatory allegations agrees with (or chooses to take on board) the content. The
trial judge’s hypothetical example, namely the statement that “the truth about
Wayne Crookes is found here” and here referred to the hyperlink connected to the
defamatory material ([2008] BCSC 1424; [2008] B.C.J. No.2012 (QL) at [34];
[2011] 3 C.L.R. 269 at [70]), usefully illustrates a text that clearly indicates
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agreement with the linked content. Here, it may be interpreted from the language
of the text (particularly the words “truth” and “here”) that Newton had
hypothetically adopted or endorsed the hyperlinked content.
The third approach by Deschamps J. focused on the plaintiff’s burden to show
that: (i) the defendant had performed a “deliberate” act that rendered the defamatory
material “readily available” to a third party in a comprehensible form; and (ii) the
third party received and understood the defamatory information. As a reflection
of the “bilateral nature of publication” (at [62]), the defendant must not only have
communicated the defamatorymaterial, but the third party must have received and
understood that defamatory material. The approach is also more holistic and
consistent with the entire fabric of a prima facie case of defamation comprising
the three elements, namely the existence of defamatory meaning, reference to
claimant and publication, all examined from the perspective of the ordinary and
reasonable third party (L. Klar, Tort Law, 4th edn (Ontario: Thomson Carswell,
2008), at 759).
Admittedly, this third approach based on the two requirements is less direct and
certain as compared to themajority rule and even the second approach ofMcLachlin
C.J. and Fish J., but this is partly due to the pragmatic need to adapt to the different
modes of communication including hyperlinks. Under requirement (i), the
defamatorymaterial will be regarded as “readily available” if it “can be immediately
accessed” (at [94]). For instance, an automatic deep hyperlink that allows
connection to the content with a mere click must be distinguished from a footnote
in a physical book.Whether the hyperlink was user-activated or automatic, shallow
or deep, and available to the general public or restricted can make a practical
difference for the readers. This readiness to adapt to the means of communication
is contrasted with the majority judgment which, though cognisant of the different
characteristics of hyperlinks, chose not to address the legal implications of the
“inherent and inexorable fluidity of evolving technologies” (at [43]).
The requirement of “deliberate act” under (i) serves as a useful signpost (and
indeed, control mechanism) for delineating the scope of “publication” of defamatory
materials in cyberspace. Reference was made to the English case of Godfrey v
Demon Internet Ltd (Application to Strike Out) [2001] Q.B. 201 in which the
internet service provider’s (ISP’s) failure to act despite the plaintiff’s request to
remove a defamatory posting on its news server, coupled with the ISP’s awareness
of the defamatory material, constituted publication of the defamatory information
(at [88]). In contrast, where the ISP in Bunt v Tilley [2006] EWHC 407 (QB);
[2007] 1 W.L.R. 1243 or the search engine inMetropolitan International Schools
Ltd v Designtechnica Corp [2009] EWHC 1765 merely played a “passive
instrumental” role, no publication arose (at [89]). There has to be a “knowing
involvement in the process of publication” of the allegedly defamatory material
(Bunt v Tilley at [23]).
On defamation via hyperlinks in particular, primary authors choose to create
the hyperlinks in the first place and must be distinguished from mere conduits of
information on websites. Yet, this fairly basic choice exercised by the author would
be present in most instances of hyperlinking and should not by itself amount to a
“deliberate act”. On the other hand, the hyperlinker’s actual knowledge (as opposed
to merely constructive knowledge) of the linked content and the relevant point in
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time when he acquired that knowledge may be significant. Control over the
hyperlinked content is also important but its absence should not necessarily negate
“publication”. It is true that the primary author does not possess control over any
subsequent changes to the content by the secondary author, a point already
highlighted by the majority judges. But this does not necessarily mean he did not
“publish” the original content. If the primary author had via the text “adopted or
endorsed” the hyperlinked content (i.e. the second approach), it is submitted that
he should be regarded as having committed a “deliberate act” in publishing the
content. In this manner, the second approach may serve as a specific rule within
Deschamps J.’s proposed framework.
The existence of a “deliberate act”, though necessary, is in itself insufficient for
“publication”. Courts would also have to examine requirement (ii) for direct
evidence and/or inferences that the third party received and understood the
defamatory information (Gaskin v Retail Credit Co [1965] S.C.R. 297 at 300).
Whether the plaintiff can successfully persuade the court to make the requisite
inferences would depend on evidence relating to, amongst others, the number of
and location of links on the page, the number of hits on the page containing the
link, changes made to the linked information and evidence of the behaviour of
internet users (at [110]).
Addressing a concern raised earlier by the majority judges, the two-stage
approach does not give rise to a legal presumption of publication via hyperlinks
(at [100] and [126]). Indeed, and rightly so, there was no publication on the facts.
As one of the links was a “shallow” link, and the impugnedmaterial was not placed
on the site’s home page and possessed separate addresses (at [124]), that defamatory
material was not “readily available” to the readers. The other link to the defamatory
materials on another website was a “deep” link to which the reader could easily
gain access with a single click on the link, thus rendering the defamatory materials
“readily available” (at [125]). However, there was no direct evidence of the receipt
of the linked content by a third party; and no inference that the defamatorymaterials
were received and understood by a third party could (and should) be drawn from
the mere number of hits on Newton’s article.
The above decision was fairly straightforward in view of the paucity of evidence
adduced by the plaintiff, though one can envisage future scenarios where the factors
might be more evenly balanced. The requirements under the two-stage approach
(in particular, the meaning of “deliberate act”) need not be writ in stone but may
be further refined in order to adapt to different technologies and novel contexts.
As a starting point, “adoption or endorsement” (i.e. the second approach) serves
as a useful indicator of “deliberate act” within the two-stage framework. Overall,
by placing the burden on the plaintiff to adduce sufficient evidence in order to
satisfy the requirements on a balance of probabilities, adequate protection for
freedom of expression on the internet is ensured without sacrificing reputational
interests entirely. Further, the defence of innocent dissemination could serve as
another layer of protection for defendants who were unaware of and did not possess
control over the linked content (at [114]), in addition to the existing defences of
fair comment (WIC Radio Ltd v Simpson [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420) and responsible
communication onmatters of public interest (Grant v Torstar Corp [2009] 3 S.C.R.
640). Finally, unlike the rigid majority rule, Deschamps J.’s approach in
350 Law Quarterly Review [Vol.128
(2012) 128 L.Q.R. July © 2012 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
determining “publication”, based on the communication of defamatory material
to a third party as well as the latter’s receipt and comprehension of the defamatory
content, would be capable of delivering more rational outcomes consistent with
the tort of defamation generally.
Gary K.Y. Chan
Singapore Management University
Canada; Defamation; Freedom of expression; Hyperlinks; Publication
July 2012] Notes 351
(2012) 128 L.Q.R. July © 2012 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
